Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2006

State of Utah v. Robert Weaver : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert Weaver; Appellee Pro Se.
Kenneth Bronston; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Weaver, No. 20060801 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6782

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellant,
Case No. 20060801-CA
vs.
ROBERT WEAVER,
Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE AN
ENHANCED CHARGE OF POSSESSION OF LESS THAN ONE OUNCE
OF MARIJUANA, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, DRIVING UNDER
THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS, A CLASS B
MISDEMEANOR, AN ENHANCED CHARGE OF POSSESSION OF
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, AND FALSE
REGISTRATION, A CLASS C MISDEMEANOR, IN THE FIFTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE JUDGE JAMES L. SCHUMATE PRESIDING
ROBERT WEAVER
5688N 1320W
ST. GEORGE, UT 84770
(435)674-0377
APPELLEE PROSE

KENNETH BRONSTON (4470)
ASSIST. ATTORNEY GENERAL
HEBER WELLS BUILDING
160E300S,6raFLOOR
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114
(801)366-0180
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

APR 11 2007

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellant,

;

vs.

]
)CaseNo.20060801-CA
]

ROBERT WEAVER,

;

Appellee.

]

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE AN
ENHANCED CHARGE OF POSSESSION OF LESS THAN ONE OUNCE
OF MARIJUANA, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, DRIVING UNDER
THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS, A CLASS B
MISDEMEANOR, AN ENHANCED CHARGE OF POSSESSION OF
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, AND FALSE
REGISTRATION, A CLASS C MISDEMEANOR, IN THE FIFTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE JUDGE JAMES L. SCHUMATE PRESIDING
ROBERT WEAVER
5688N 1320W
ST. GEORGE, UT 84770
(435)674-0377
APPELLEE PRO SE

KENNETH BRONSTON (4470)
ASSIST. ATTORNEY GENERAL
HEBER WELLS BUILDING
160E 300S, 6™ FLOOR
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114
(801)366-0180
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, PRESERVATION,
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTE

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT

6

JUDGE SCHUMATE CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
TRAFFIC STOP WAS UNJUSTIFIABLY PROLONGED WHEN
OFFICER MITCHELL DETAINED APPELLEE AFTER HE
HAD DETERMINED THAT THE REGISTRATION AND
OWNERSHIP WERE FULLY IN ORDER
6
OFFICER MITCHELL HAD NO REASONABLY
ARTICULABLE BASIS TO SUSPECT THAT A CRIME
OR A TRAFFIC VIOLATION HAD BEEN COMMITTED

8

APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT'S ARE FATALLY FLAWED

14

CONCLUSION

16

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Brown v. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590 (1975)

10

Florida v.Roger. 460 U.S. 490 (1983)

8,9

United States v. Fernandez. 18 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1994)

13

United Stated v.Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988)

9

United States v. Hunnicut. 135 F.3d 1345 (10th Cir. 1998)
United States v. Salzano. 158F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 1998)
United States v. Walker. 807 F. Supp. 115 (D. Utah 1990)

8,13,15
13
9,10,11

United States v. Walker. 933 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1991)

6

United States v. Wisnewski. 358 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (D. Utah 2005)

6

Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968)

7,13

STATE CASES
State v. Callahan. 2004 UT App 164,93 P.3d 103

2

State v. Duran. 2005 UT App 409,131 P.3d 246

2

State v. Higgins. 844 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994)

12

State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1132 (Utah 1994)

6

STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. 41-la-1305 (West 2004)
n

1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellant,
vs.

]
) CaseNo.20060801-CA
]

ROBERT WEAVER,

]

Appellee,

)

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

This is an appeal of an order dismissing with prejudice the charges filed by
the State of Utah against the Appellee. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal of the order of the District Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, PRESERVATION, AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue in this appeal is whether Deputy Mitchell violated the Appellee's
Constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
under Utah Code Ann. 41-la-1305 (West 2004). Specifically, the Court is asked
to determine whether the Deputy's extending the traffic stop, by ordering appellee
out of his vehicle and continuing the interrogation after the Deputy had made the
1

determination that the registration, VIN number, driver's license and insurance
matched the vehicle and were in order and after he made the statement to dispatch
that he intended to return appellee's license and registration papers and to tell him
to contact Nevada D.M.V., was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Preservation: This issue was preserved by Appellee's Motion to Suppress
evidence. R29.
Standard of Review: The appellate court reviews the district court's factual
findings under a clearly erroneous standard. See State v. Callahan, 2004 UT App
164, 93 P.3d 103. The appellate court reviews of the trial court's conclusions of
law under a correctness standard. See State v. Duran. 2005 UT App 409, 131 P.3d
246.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTE
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Utah Code
Ann41-la-1305.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee was charged with various misdemeanor traffic offenses as well as
misdemeanor possession of marijuana and DUL Defendant filed a motion to
suppress the evidence obtained by the State. R29-43. The Court held hearings on
February 14, 2006 and on March 27, 2006. Judge James Shumate granted the
2

motion on March 27,2006. R67. Said charges were dismissed on motion by the
State. R88. The State appealed. R89.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal involves dismissed criminal charges of possession of .3 grams
of marijuana and false registration. The matter started as a routine traffic stop that
occurred on September 6, 2005 in a Wal-Mart parking lot. Appellee's vehicle was
stopped by an Officer Mitchell due to a concern over the registration. R102: 410, 20, 27. When Officer Mitchell approached the appellee's vehicle he stated
that he had stopped the car due to possible false registration. Rl 02:24. Officer
Mitchell testified that he checked the VIN in the windshield and that everything in
his hands appeared to be correct and to match the vehicle. Rl02:25. At some
unknown time, dispatch realized that it had made an error regarding the
registration and informed Officer Mitchell. Judge Schumate made a specific
factual finding that dispatch had made a mistake in running appellee's plates.
R102:31-32.
Officer Mitchell testified at the suppression hearing that the appellee's
driver's license was also confirmed with dispatch as being valid and was
consistent with the other forms presented to the traffic officer. R102: 24-25. No
warrants were found for the defendant and no other indicia of criminal activity
3

existed at this time per Officer Mitchell's testimony. R102: 24-25. At this
juncture the Officer turned on his video-camera and recorded the events thereafter.
Judge Shumate relied on the videotape in granting the motion to suppress. R7678; R102:2-9.
The beginning of the videotape contains a conversation between the Officer
and dispatch. Judge Schumate summarized the conversation as follows:
"After the deputy had his conversation by cell phone with dispatch center, the
deputy put in his conversation with dispatch and noted at 20:46:45 that he was
going to go to Mr. Weaver and tell Mr. Weaver that Mr. Weaver should check
with Nevada DMV - Department of Motor Vehicles- to tell them that they have
very peculiar information on their database regarding his license number. That the
deputy was satisfied that this vehicle was appropriately registered and licensed to
Mr. Weaver is inferred by the Court from the deputy's determination to make this
statement to Mr. Weaver, and all things being equal, that would be the end of the
encounter." R100: 6.
Officer Mitchell was asked the following question at the suppression
hearing: "Was there any other information that the defendant could have given to
you to convince you that he was in fact the registered owner of the car, other than
the documentation that he gave you?" Officer Mitchell's answer was simply and
4

singularly "No." Rl 02:26. On further cross-examination Officer Mitchell
responded to this issue as follows:
Q: There was nothing more I could tell you that would convince you that I
was in fact the owner of the car, correct?
A: "Correct. * * *"

R102:30.

Despite the regularity of the various proofs presented to Deputy Mitchell, he
inexplicably returned to the defendant's car and ordered him to exit the vehicle.
V20:46:43-48. Nothing had changed between the time he told dispatch that he
was intending to return appellee's proofs and when he ordered appellee out of his
car and began an interrogation. His only justification for extending the stop was
as follows:
"Well, I - what we usually do is if there's two people, maybe you're not
giving me straight answers or something so I want to separate you, and so that's you know, I want just to talk to you." Rl 02:30.
Officer Mitchell testified on direct examination at the suppression hearing
that he had smelled alcohol while appellee was still in his car. However, on cross
examination and when presented with the arrest report, Officer Mitchell admitted
that he was mistaken in his testimony and that it was not until after appellee was
removed from his car that the deputy detected an odor of alcohol on appellee's
5

breath. R102: 27-28.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees to each citizen
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by any governmental
agency. Deputy Mitchell had no reasonably articulable basis to suspect that any
laws had been broken by appellee or that any criminal activity may be occurring.
Officer Mitchell violated the appellee's fourth amendment rights by prolonging
the traffic stop after the purpose of the stop had been effectuated.
ARGUMENT
JUDGE SCHUMATE CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE TRAFFIC
STOP WAS UNJUSTIFIABLY PROLONGED WHEN OFFICER MITCHELL
DETAINED APPELLEE AFTER HE HAD DETERMINED THAT THE
REGISTRATION AND OWNERSHIP WERE FULLY IN ORDER
Utah courts have long recognized that stopping a vehicle and detaining its
occupants is a seizure and must be analyzed under the reasonableness inquiries of
the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Wisnewski. 358 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1086
(D. Utah 2005), citing United States v. Walker. 933 F.2d 812, 815 (10th Cir. 1991).
"Once a traffic stop is made, it must last no longer than is necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop." State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127,1132 (Utah 1994).
Because a normal traffic stop is similar to an investigative detention, it must be
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analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Pursuant to the legal analysis set forth in Terry, a traffic stop is reasonable if
the traffic officer's actions were justified at its inception and if the scope of the
was reasonably related to the circumstances which justified the stop in the first
place. Terry at 20. Applying the Terry test to the instant action, it is clear that
Officer Mitchell's extended stop of the vehicle was not legally justified.
The suppression hearing testimony of Officer Mitchell indicated that the
appellee's vehicle was stopped because of a discrepancy with the vehicle's
registration. It is undisputed that the appellee produced a copy of the valid
Nevada registration, proof of insurance and his valid Utah driver's license. All
these documents identified the appellee as the registered owner of the vehicle, as
the named insured, and contained an accurate VIN number for the vehicle.
Rl 02:24. Officer Mitchell testified that no discrepancies existed with these
proofs. Id. Officer Mitchell also examined the VIN number from outside the
front windshield and verified that the VIN number was the same as that contained
on the registration form and insurance form. IT 102: 24-25.
Any alleged discrepancy regarding ownership of the vehicle was resolved
by these proofs. Any further detention of the defendant was an unlawful seizure
of his person under the Fourth Amendment and could in no way advance the issue
7

of ownership of the vehicle. Officer Mitchell admitted that there was no other
proofs that the appellee could be expected to produce to prove legal ownership
and that there was nothing the appellee could say or do to substantiate this fact.
R102: 26. Additionally, Officer Mitchell testified that police radio dispatch
advised that they made a mistake running the plates of the appellee's vehicle.
R102:8. Officer Mitchell could not recall whether dispatch informed him of the
mistake before or after appellee was administered a breath test. Id.
Evidence was produced in suppression motion that Officer Mitchell's knew,
at the time of the arrest of appellee, that the vehicle was not stolen. R29 at Exhibit
5. Officer Mitchell listed the owner of the vehicle as the defendant on the
impound document that he completed. Jd. Had Officer Mitchell truly believed that
the car was stolen, he clearly would not have listed the appellee as the owner on
the impound form.
OFFICER MITCHELL HAD NO REASONABLY ARTICULABLE BASIS TO
SUSPECT THAT A CRIME OR A TRAFFIC VIOLATION HAD BEEN
COMMITTED
It is well established that a traffic stop must "last no longer than is
reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Additionally, the
"scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification"
United States v. Hunnicut 135 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Florida
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v. Roger. 460 U.S. 490, 500 (1983).
A police officer may detain someone longer than is reasonably related to the
underlying stop only under two very limited occasions: (1) when the officer has an
objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that illegal activity has occurred
or is occurring, or (2) when the initial detention becomes a consensual encounter
Hunnicut at 1349. It is quite clear that the appellee did not consent to the further
detention of his being or his vehicle. Thus only the first prong of the exception to
extending the traffic stop applies in this case.
Officer Mitchell's continued detention of the defendant and subsequent
conduct was flagrantly unlawful as it went well beyond that needed to verify the
ownership of the vehicle. As the Utah Court recognized in U.S. v. Walker, an
officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a license and registration, run
a computer check and issue a citation. "When the driver has produced a valid
license and proof that he is entitled to operate the vehicle, he must be allowed to
proceed on his way without being subject to further delay by police for further
questioning." 807 F. Supp. 115, 117 (D. Utah 1992), quoting United States v.
Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988). The Walker Court specifically noted that
Utah's "peace officers must conform their official conduct to the standard quoted
above." After the requirements of Guzman have been met, the officer in this case
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had the duty to let appellee proceed without being subject to further delay for
additional questioning.
Officer Mitchell failed to comply with Utah law and the U.S. Constitution
regarding traffic stops. Rather than allowing the appellee to proceed without
further delay he unlawfully seized the defendant without probable cause to inquire
into matters unrelated to the traffic stop, seeking information to which the officer
was not then entitled. As the Utah court recognized in Walker, "such conduct is
flagrant and such purpose directly exploits the unlawful detention. Both the
conduct and the purpose are in direct violation of the law set forth in Guzman."
The instant set of facts are so similar to be legally identical to the facts
pertaining to the detention in Walker. In short, the inquiry from the time the
appellee was told to exit his vehicle should never have occurred. "The stain of the
illegal detention colors the whole continuum of events . . . They are all of one
piece.9' Walker at 118. Supreme Court Justice Powell noted that he would
require some demonstrably effective break in the chain of events leading from an
illegal arrest to the search, such as the accused's presentation before a magistrate
for a determination of probable cause, before the taint can be removed." Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590(1975).
In the instant case, the subsequent inquiry into appellee's alleged
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consumption of beer, the field sobriety test, the three subsequent searches of the
appellee's vehicle and the evidence seized from the vehicle and his person (i.e.,
urine sample) were all the result of the exploitation of an unlawful detention. This
unlawfully obtained evidence was properly suppressed by Judge Schumate, as was
done in Walker. Suppression of this evidence is necessary not to "insulate a
defendant from prosecution but to vindicate- take seriously- the applicable
constitutional provision." United States v. Walker. 753 F. Supp. 199, 204 (D.
Utah 1990). "In sum, the state, in fulfilling its responsibility to deal with the
lawless, must itself act lawfully." Id,
It is clear that the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated by
the expanded scope of the traffic stop. Officer Mitchell had already obtained the
vehicle's registration papers, examined the VIN number on the vehicle and its
license plate carefully, and spent a considerable amount of time in his police
cruiser communicating with dispatch. Judge Schumate made a specific finding
that Officer was "communicating with dispatch center not by radio but over the
cell phone. So that while we have audible conversation on the radio, most of the
conversation that we have does not pertain to Mr. Weaver at all." R 100:4. After
performing all these tasks and detaining the defendant for quite some time, Officer
Mitchell then again approached the appellee's car and forced him to exit his

11

vehicle.
Officer Mitchell's actions made it clear to the appellee that he was not free
to leave the scene and that he was being detained and further scrutinized. In State
v. Higgins. the Utah Supreme Court made it clear that once a person is seized for
Fourth Amendment purposes it must be clear to the seized person from the words
of the officer that the person is at liberty to go about his business. 844 P.2d 1242,
1244 (Utah 1994). Judge Schumate's synopsis of the videotape of the incident
makes clear that Officer Mitchell's police cruiser was parked directly behind the
appellee's vehicle, making it impossible for the appellee to drive away.
Additionally, Officer Mitchell retained the appellee's driver's license, registration
and insurance papers, a clear indication that he was not a liberty to leave.
Officer Mitchell's testimony at the suppression hearing never indicated that
appellee's speech was slurred, that his eyes were red or droopy, that he smelled
alcohol or marijuana emanating from him or from his vehicle, that he saw any
open or closed containers in the vehicle, or that he appeared to be intoxicated or
impaired in any manner. Nonetheless, Officer Mitchell found it necessary to
further detain the appellee and required him to exit his vehicle for reasons never
stated. This detention was clearly unreasonable under these circumstances.
Officer Mitchell lacked reasonable suspicion that a crime or traffic violation
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may have been committed. Reasonable suspicion must be determined by
examining the alleged factors within the " totality of the circumstances." United
States v.Fernandez. 18 F.3d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1994). Although the nature of the
"totality of the circumstances makes it possible for individually innocuous factors
to add up to reasonable suspicion, it is impossible for a combination of wholly
innocent factors to combine into a suspicious conglomeration unless there are
concrete reasons for such an interpretation." United States v. Salzano. 158 F.3d
1107, 1114-5 (10th Cir. 1998).
There were no factors at the initial traffic stop that warranted further
detention. Nothing in the Officer's testimony provides any guidance as to the
reasons for extending the traffic stop at that time. His sole justification for
extending the stop and ordering appellee out of the car was that "you know, I just
want to talk to you." Rl 02:30. After exiting the vehicle Officer Mitchell began
questioning the appellee regarding where he was going, what he was doing, and
whether he had been drinking any alcohol. This conversation should never have
taken place. At this point in time, Officer Mitchell lacked articulabiy reasonable
suspicion to detain the appellee. Any further delay consisted of an unlawful
seizure under the doctrine enunciated in Terry v. Ohio and U.S. v. Hunnicut.
supra.
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APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT'S ARE FATALLY FLAWED
Judge Schumate correctly recognized that the purpose of the stop was
complete when Officer Mitchell told dispatch that he was satisfied with the
appellee's proofs and that he was going to tell him to contact Nevada DMV.
Officer Mitchell had completed his own investigation and had no legal right to
continue the interrogation. He had a duty to allow appellee to proceed without
further delay. Any additional interrogation, whether inside the vehicle or in the
parking lot, violated the appellee's Fourth Amendment rights.
Appellant is hard pressed to find a legal basis to overturn Judge Schumate's
decision. Its brief absurdly argues that Judge Schumate misunderstood the law
involving the Fourth Amendment. App. Brf. at 6-8. Judge Schumate likely has
more experience with the Constitution than both counsel together. He correctly
applied the law to the facts as he found them.

This Court must defer to his

factual findings and should affirm his legal conclusions, all of which are
consistent with Utah law and the Fourth Amendment.
Appellant's contention that the purpose of the traffic stop was not complete
until appellee was returned his possessions is misplaced. App. Brief at 7-9. The
undisputed purpose of the stop was to determine whether the vehicle was
registered to the driver. After Deputy Mitchell had completed his very thorough
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investigation of the matter, he made the decision that the vehicle was registered to
the driver. This should have been the end to any inquiry on the subject. The fact
that he still had possession of the driver's license and registration papers does not
mean that his inquiry was incomplete. At this point in time, absent any other
indicia of criminal activity, Officer Mitchell was obliged to return the appellee's
driver's license and registration and to allow appellee to proceed without further
delay. See U.S. v. Hunnicut supra. Any further interrogation, inside or outside of
the appellee's vehicle, violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Any suggestion to
the contrary is inconsistent with the laws of the State of Utah and the U.S.
Constitution, Judge Schumate did not misunderstand the law and correctly
applied it to the facts as he found them. Any arguments to the contrary are wholly
misplaced and unsupported by the facts and the law.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Officer Mitchell's extended seizure of the
appellee lacked reasonable suspicion and probable cause. It was thus unlawful
under the Fourth Amendment. Appellee respectfully request that this Court
uphold the decision by Judge Schumate to suppress the evidence unlawfully
obtained by the State.
RESPECTFULLY SUBlVgTOD this 26th day of April, 2007.

Lobert A. Weaver
5688 N 1320 W
St. George, Utah 84770
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